Unless you have been living undertransparent a rock for the last week, you know who Carli Lloyd is. If, however, you do not, she is the reigning World Cup MVP for Team USA. On Sunday, in perhaps the most astonishing World Cup performance of all time, Lloyd scored a hat trick in just the 16th minute of the game, and propelled Team USA to its third Women’s World Cup championship. You may be wondering, how is this related to intellectual property, and I promise you, I am getting there.

After Lloyd scored her second goal in the first five minutes of Sunday’s World Cup final, her official website’s server crashed because it was getting so much traffic. Just eleven minutes later, Lloyd scored her third goal and transitioned into a household name. During the game alone, Lloyd gained 50,000 Twitter followers. By now, the connection between this article and intellectual property may be evident: Lloyd’s spike in popularity also caused a spike in the value of her likeness.

Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines likeness as (1) a picture of a person; or (2) the quality or state of being alike or similar especially in appearance. California law provides that the appropriation of a person’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness for a commercial use is actionable. Thus, a celebrity is entitled to control the use of their likeness in the commercial context to their financial gain if they so desire. Simply put, Lloyd’s hat trick may have not just cemented her spot in World Cup history, but also greatly increased her wealth.

Continue Reading Lloyd’s Likeness: A Hat Trick to Superstardom and Mega Endorsements

Many who enjoy champagne have noticed that their favorite cuvée has quietly changed its label. Many of the world’s bottles of bubbly now indicate that they contain “sparkling wine” when they used to be “champagne.” Those who enjoy Basmati rice or Camembert cheese also have noticed changes to the names of their favorite products. What happened? Why we are now drinking sparkling wine when we used to enjoy champagne, or why we must settle for brie when we previously enjoyed Roquefort?

Although the names have changed, the products probably have not. Rather, many countries have created a system which recognizes and protects the value of the intellectual property associated with the geographic origin of certain products. Functioning like a trademark, a geographical indication can represent valuable intellectual property by identifying a particular region as the source of a certain product. Although not traditionally protected by trademark laws, geographical indications and designations of geographic origin have traditionally been afforded protection by various countries. Long known for its famous varieties of cheese, wine, and, of course, champagne, France introduced one of the first systems designed to protect geographical indications, known as appellation d’origine contrôlée, or the “AOC.” Sacre bleu! The AOC makes it unlawful to manufacture and sell a product under a geographical indication identified by the AOC unless that product complies with a set of strict criteria, including production of AOC-protected products in particular regions.

Continue Reading Keep Calm and Sip Some Sparkling Wine

On Monday, the United States Supreme Court Audrey-Millemann-03_webupheld the longstanding case law that prohibits a patent owner from receiving royalties after a patent has expired. In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC (June 22, 2015) 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067, the Court ruled in favor of Marvel, the licensee of a patent for a Spiderman web-shooting toy.

The plaintiff, Stephen Kimble, had patented the web-shooting toy. Kimble had talked to Marvel about licensing his patent, but Marvel declined to take a license. Shortly thereafter, Marvel began selling a suspiciously similar web-shooting toy.

Kimble sued Marvel for patent infringement. The parties settled. Pursuant to the settlement, Marvel bought the patent from Kimble for a lump sum and a three-percent royalty on future sells of the toys.

Marvel later filed a declaratory judgement action in the district court, seeking a judgment that Marvel could stop paying Kimble royalties when the patent expired in 2010. Marvel relied on Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), in which the Supreme Court had held that a patent owner could not receive royalty payments after the patent had expired, and that agreements that provided for post-term patent royalties were per se unlawful.

Continue Reading Everything Old is New Again: Post-Expiration Patent Royalties are a Bad Idea!

Richard Prince is either on the very edge of fair use or is engaging in Scott-Hervey-10-webblatant copyright infringement. Unlike most however, Prince has been down this road before; accused of infringement and a defense based entirely on fair use. What is different about Prince, and what might explain the sheer boldness of his recent project, is the last time Prince was accused of copyright infringement, he ultimately prevailed on appeal to the 2nd Circuit.

Prince is a practitioner of what has come to be known as “appropriation art,” that is, art – mainly visual art – that incorporates and utilizes third-party images and photographs, which are often the subject of copyright.

In 2008, Prince created thirty works of art that comprised a series he called Canal Zone. The works in Canal Zone made use of a number of images from Patrick Cariou’s photography book on Rastafarians in Jamaica called “Yes Rasta”. In the Canal Zone works, Prince had enlarged, cut up, and painted over Cariou’s images, as well as placed them with other images. While not directly a factor in the Court’s infringement analysis but certainly a motivating factor behind Cariou’s lawsuit, while Cariou had little commercial success with his book, Yes Rasta, Prince sold eight of the Canal Zone works for a total of over $10 million.

Cariou initially won on summary judgment at the district court level, and obtained a permanent injunction compelling Prince to turn over all of the unsold Canal Zone works for sale, disposal or destruction. In its ruling, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that Prince’s works did not qualify as a “fair use” because, among other things, they were not transformative in that they did not “comment on” Cariou’s photographs or the subjects of the photographs, and Prince himself did not articulate any transformative intent in connection with the use of the images. Pic2

On appeal, Prince challenged the lower court’s analysis of the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use. The purpose of this factor is to test whether the allegedly infringing work is “transformative”. A work is transformative when it adds something new to the work allegedly infringed, with a further purpose or different character, altering the original work with new expression, meaning, or message. A work is transformative if it does something more than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work. A transformative work is one that serves a new and different function from the original work and is not a substitute for it. As the Supreme Court noted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, … that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”

Continue Reading Richard Prince once again pushes the limits of fair use

A U.S. patent is “presumed” valid. Audrey-Millemann-03_webThat means a patent owner does not need to prove the patent is valid in a suit for infringement. And, as the U.S. Supreme Court just explained in Commil United States, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 2015 U.S. LEXIS 3406 (May 26, 2015), a defendant’s belief that the patent is invalid is not a defense to infringement.

Commil owned a patent that covered a method for increasing the speed of wireless networks. Commil sued Cisco for patent infringement, alleging that Cisco directly infringed the patent by making and using certain network equipment. Commil also alleged that Cisco indirectly infringed the patent by inducing infringement, that is, by selling the equipment to others and instructing them how to use the equipment, causing them to thereby infringe the patent.

At trial, the jury found that Cisco had directly infringed the patent. With respect to the claim of indirect infringement, Cisco contended that it did not have the required specific intent to induce infringement because it believed in good faith that the patent was invalid. The district court for the Eastern District of Texas ruled that Cisco’s evidence of its good faith belief was not admissible as a defense to infringement. The jury found Cisco liable to Commil and awarded Commil $63.7 million in damages.

Cisco appealed to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court’s ruling was erroneous. The appellate court reversed the district court, holding that a good faith belief that a patent is invalid is sufficient to negate the required specific intent to induce infringement.

Continue Reading Just Because You Think It’s Invalid Doesn’t Mean You Don’t Infringe!