transparentOn September 11, 2014, the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on the appeal in Davis v. Electronic Arts (Case No. 12-15737), a class action lawsuit brought by three former NFL Players against Electronic Arts (“EA”), the publisher of the renowned Madden NFL Games.  Michael Davis, Vince Ferragamo, and Billy Joe Dupree claimed that EA violated their right of publicity by using their likeness and the likeness of six thousand other similarly situated former NFL players without permission.  The Ninth Circuit has yet to issue its ruling on the appeal, but most legal scholars agree that EA has almost no chance of prevailing on the issue in light of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Keller v. Electronic Arts (Case No. 10-15387) where the Ninth Circuit found that EA unlawfully utilized the images of collegiate athletes in its NCAA Football game series.

 

Interestingly, EA put forth the same argument in Davis as it did in Keller.  Specifically, EA argued that its portrayal of the class members is protected by the First Amendment under the doctrine of transformative use, which analyzes whether the challenged work or product contains significant transformative elements (or value that) does not derive primarily from the celebrity’s fame.

 

At the oral argument, counsel for EA cited to a footnote in the Keller decision wherein the court reserved the “question of whether the First Amendment furnishes a defense other than those the parties raise.”  EA argued that the footnote provided the court with the wiggle room it needed to come to a different conclusion than it did in Keller.  EA urged that the court prescribe a second standard for the use of likeness in books, films, and video games.  Specifically, EA argued that the extensive labor and detail involved in making a video game should almost guarantee that the product is entitled to First Amendment protection as an expressive work.  Judge Marsha S. Berzon was not very receptive to this argument and remarked that the creation of a video game sounded more like a compilation of data than an expressive work.  EA responded that a great deal of creative expression is embodied in that compilation.  Whether the Court accepts EA’s position remains to be seen.  Continue Reading Electronic Arts and its Disrespect for the Game

If you use Facebook, you probably already have noticed that many users are posting statements claiming that Facebook somehow acquires ownership of users’ intellectual property that has been posted to that site.  Reacting to this entirely erroneous proposition, many Facebook users have posted very scary and onerous status updates aggressively asserting their intellectual property rights in the materials they have uploaded onto Facebook.  One user posted that they “hereby declare that my copyright is attached to all of my personal details, illustrations, comics, paintings, crafts, professional photos and videos, etc. . . . for commercial use of the above my written consent is needed at all times!”  (Undoubtedly her use of an exclamation point will add significant legal weight when this status update is considered by a court in the forthcoming case of Everyone v. Facebook.)  That same user warns us that violation of her privacy is punished by law, UCC 1 1-308-308 1-103 and the Rome Statute.  Undoubtedly, Facebook is horrified by the prospect of violating either of these statutes.  Or not.

This Facebook user (and legions of other Facebook users who (ironically) have copied her ominous copyright warning) apparently have missed the plainly worded terms governing the use of Facebook’s online services.  While it’s not clear how the Uniform Commercial Code or the Rome Statute possibly could govern the relationship between a Facebook user and the website, the Facebook terms of use agreement clearly states that “you own all of the content and information you post on Facebook . . . .”  The agreement further provides that users merely give Facebook a limited, non-exclusive license to any intellectual property content posted on the website, a license which expires when the content is deleted by the user.  Perhaps these simple contract terms were missed during the analysis of international criminal statutes (which have not been ratified in the United States), or laws related to the sale of goods. Continue Reading Your Facebook Copyright Notice is More Annoying than Farmville

Recently the 11th Circuit addressed on appeal the question of whether fair use insulates from copyright liability a University which offers to its students a digital repository of reading material culled from third party publications without the benefit of a license.   Three academic publishers filed suit against Georgia State University claiming that the University infringed their copyrights by maintaining a policy which allows GSU professors to make digital copies of excerpts of their books available to students without paying them a royalty.  Prior copyright cases known as the “course pack cases” – cases in which commercial copy shops were found to have infringed copyrights by printing course packs containing excerpts from third party publications without permission from the publishers – seemed to dictate a finding of infringement.  However, of the 74 instances of infringement alleged, the lower court found that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement for 26 works and that fair use applied to all but 5 instances.

The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright.   The four factors a court must consider in determining whether fair use applies are: (1) the purpose of the allegedly infringing use, (2) the nature of the original work, (3) the size and significance of the portion of the original work that was copied, and (4) the effect of the allegedly infringing use on the potential market for or value of the original. Continue Reading Cambridge v. Becker – A Copyright Win For Publishers or an Enlargement of Fair Use?

In March 2014, this column analyzed a decision by a Ninth Circuit panel in Garcia v. Google, Inc., in which the Court held that an actress, who believed she was appearing in a minor role in an Arabian adventure movie, could maintain a copyright infringement claim against the producers when they used the footage instead in an anti-Islamic film that resulted in her receiving death threats. As the prior column surmised, it appeared that “bad” (although entirely sympathetic) facts were making “bad” law.

This week, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it would rehear the matter en banc and ordered that its previous decision “not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.” It remains to be seen whether the entire Ninth Circuit will take a different position this time (and hold that the lower court properly denied the injunctive relief) or take the opportunity to emphasize just how limited the scope of its prior ruling was intended to reach.

Below is the original column analyzing the Ninth Ciruit’s original ruling in this case.

A Bit Part, A Fatwa and Copyright Infringement

Most law students learn early in law school the old maxim: “Bad facts make bad law.”  A recent Ninth Circuit case, Garcia v. Google, Inc., seems certain to test this proposition with its incredibly sympathetic facts. Continue Reading 9th Circuit Agrees to En Banc Rehearing of Garcia v. Google, Inc.