If you use Facebook, you probably already have noticed that many users are posting statements claiming that Facebook somehow acquires ownership of users’ intellectual property that has been posted to that site.  Reacting to this entirely erroneous proposition, many Facebook users have posted very scary and onerous status updates aggressively asserting their intellectual property rights in the materials they have uploaded onto Facebook.  One user posted that they “hereby declare that my copyright is attached to all of my personal details, illustrations, comics, paintings, crafts, professional photos and videos, etc. . . . for commercial use of the above my written consent is needed at all times!”  (Undoubtedly her use of an exclamation point will add significant legal weight when this status update is considered by a court in the forthcoming case of Everyone v. Facebook.)  That same user warns us that violation of her privacy is punished by law, UCC 1 1-308-308 1-103 and the Rome Statute.  Undoubtedly, Facebook is horrified by the prospect of violating either of these statutes.  Or not.

This Facebook user (and legions of other Facebook users who (ironically) have copied her ominous copyright warning) apparently have missed the plainly worded terms governing the use of Facebook’s online services.  While it’s not clear how the Uniform Commercial Code or the Rome Statute possibly could govern the relationship between a Facebook user and the website, the Facebook terms of use agreement clearly states that “you own all of the content and information you post on Facebook . . . .”  The agreement further provides that users merely give Facebook a limited, non-exclusive license to any intellectual property content posted on the website, a license which expires when the content is deleted by the user.  Perhaps these simple contract terms were missed during the analysis of international criminal statutes (which have not been ratified in the United States), or laws related to the sale of goods. Continue Reading Your Facebook Copyright Notice is More Annoying than Farmville

Recently the 11th Circuit addressed on appeal the question of whether fair use insulates from copyright liability a University which offers to its students a digital repository of reading material culled from third party publications without the benefit of a license.   Three academic publishers filed suit against Georgia State University claiming that the University infringed their copyrights by maintaining a policy which allows GSU professors to make digital copies of excerpts of their books available to students without paying them a royalty.  Prior copyright cases known as the “course pack cases” – cases in which commercial copy shops were found to have infringed copyrights by printing course packs containing excerpts from third party publications without permission from the publishers – seemed to dictate a finding of infringement.  However, of the 74 instances of infringement alleged, the lower court found that the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement for 26 works and that fair use applied to all but 5 instances.

The fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright.   The four factors a court must consider in determining whether fair use applies are: (1) the purpose of the allegedly infringing use, (2) the nature of the original work, (3) the size and significance of the portion of the original work that was copied, and (4) the effect of the allegedly infringing use on the potential market for or value of the original. Continue Reading Cambridge v. Becker – A Copyright Win For Publishers or an Enlargement of Fair Use?

In March 2014, this column analyzed a decision by a Ninth Circuit panel in Garcia v. Google, Inc., in which the Court held that an actress, who believed she was appearing in a minor role in an Arabian adventure movie, could maintain a copyright infringement claim against the producers when they used the footage instead in an anti-Islamic film that resulted in her receiving death threats. As the prior column surmised, it appeared that “bad” (although entirely sympathetic) facts were making “bad” law.

This week, the Ninth Circuit ruled that it would rehear the matter en banc and ordered that its previous decision “not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.” It remains to be seen whether the entire Ninth Circuit will take a different position this time (and hold that the lower court properly denied the injunctive relief) or take the opportunity to emphasize just how limited the scope of its prior ruling was intended to reach.

Below is the original column analyzing the Ninth Ciruit’s original ruling in this case.

A Bit Part, A Fatwa and Copyright Infringement

Most law students learn early in law school the old maxim: “Bad facts make bad law.”  A recent Ninth Circuit case, Garcia v. Google, Inc., seems certain to test this proposition with its incredibly sympathetic facts. Continue Reading 9th Circuit Agrees to En Banc Rehearing of Garcia v. Google, Inc.

One of the more important intellectual property cases decided in 2014 is the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (2014) 134 S.Ct. 1749.  In that case, the Supreme Court announced a new test for awarding attorneys’ fees in patent infringement cases, holding that the existing test used by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was “overly rigid.”

The plaintiff, Octane Fitness, and the defendant, ICON Health, both made elliptical exercise machines.  ICON owned a U.S. patent for its machine.  ICON sued Octane for patent infringement.  The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of Octane.  Octane filed a motion to seeking its attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. section 285.  The district court denied the motion.  On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “the framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture Mfg. v. Dutailier International (Fed. Cir. 2005) 393 F.3d 1378 is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”  Id. at 1755.  The Court held that the Federal Circuit’s test in Brooks Furniture was “overly rigid.”  Id. at 1756.  Under that test, a case was exceptional if there was either:  (1) litigation-related misconduct, or (2) subjective bad faith and objective baselessness.  According to the Federal Circuit, the first alternative, litigation misconduct, would be found it there was willful infringement, vexatious litigation, a Rule 11 violation, or fraud or inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent.  Under the second alternative, subjective bad faith was met only if the plaintiff actually knew that its suit was objectively baseless, and objective baselessness was met if no reasonable litigant could believe they would prevail.  In addition, the Brooks court held that a defendant had to prove an exceptional case by clear and convincing evidence. Continue Reading Attorneys’ Fees for Patent Infringement – Easier to Obtain!