By: Scott Hervey 

Businesses that feature music, either in the background, through a DJ, or live, must secure a public performance license from one or both of the major U.S. performance rights organizations, ASCAP and BMI.  The corporate operator of the Southern California chain of Roscoe’s House of Chicken and Waffles, East Coast Foods, Inc., learned this lesson the hard way; so did East Coast’s owner.  It came as no surprise that the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s finding of copyright infringement against the corporate operator of the restaurant chain.  What should be a wake up call for all business owners is that East Coast Foods’ president and primary shareholder, Herbert Hudson, was held individually liable for vicarious copyright infringement. 

East Coast operates a number of Roscoe’s House of Chicken and Waffles throughout Southern California, including a location in Long Beach.  Herbert Hudson is the sole officer and director of East Coast.  Attached to the Long Beach Roscoe’s is a bar and lounge area called the Sea Bird Jazz Lounge.

Continue Reading Roscoe’s House of Chicken and Waffles Runs Afoul Of Music Publishers

By: Nathan Geronimo

We have all participated in practical jokes.  If good-natured, executed correctly, and within the bounds of civility, practical jokes can be a fun way to get closer to people.  However, sometimes jokes can be anything but funny, and in the worst cases can constitute a crime.  In a recent case involving social media sites, California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal found that a minor’s conduct on Facebook constituted identity theft, which can be a misdemeanor or a felony.  In In re Rolando S., a juvenile obtained a classmate’s Facebook login information and accessed her Facebook page.  The minor was able to access the victim’s Facebook page because he received an unsolicited text message with the victim’s email password.  Armed with the email account information and password, he used this information to log into the victim’s Facebook account.  Once in the account, he made obscene changes to the victim’s profile, and posted lewd messages on two of the victim’s male friends’ pages purportedly as the victim. 

The minor was charged with willfully obtaining personal identifying information (which includes unique electronic data) and using it for an unlawful purpose, a violation of California Penal Code section 530.5.  The minor admitted to accessing the victim’s Facebook page and making the offending posts and changes, and he was convicted of identity theft.  On appeal, the minor argued that because he received the victim’s login information via unsolicited text message, that he did not “willfully” obtain the personal identifying information.  The Court disagreed, finding that the minor willfully obtained the information when he chose to remember the password from the text, and used the password to access the victim’s Facebook account.  Essentially, the Court found that the minor demonstrated a willingness to commit the act. 

Continue Reading Facebook Hijinks No Joking Matter

By: James Kachmar

The Ninth Circuit recently dealt with the issue of whether the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) prevents a plaintiff from bringing a Lanham Act claim alleging that the name and labeling of a juice beverage is deceptive and misleading.  The plaintiff Pom Wonderful LLC (“Pom”) produces and sells pomegranate juice and pomegranate juice blends.  In 2007, Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”) announced that it would start selling a new product called “Pomegranate Blueberry” and “Pomegranate Blueberry Flavored Blend of 5 Juices.”  Despite its name, only 0.5% of the juice was actually pomegranate/blueberry juice, while the rest of it was apple, grape and raspberry.  Believing that it was losing sales to Coca-Cola’s product, Pom sued Coca-Cola alleging that it violated the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act for making a false or misleading description or representation about its goods.

Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that plaintiff’s claims were barred because in construing the product’s name and labeling, Pom’s claim “could improperly require the court to interpret and to apply FDA regulations on juice beverage labeling.”  After allowing Pom to file an amended complaint and conduct discovery, the court granted summary judgment to Coca-Cola and held that Pom’s Lanham Act challenge to the product’s name and labeling was barred by the FDCA’s implementing regulations.  Pom appealed this ruling.

Continue Reading What’s in a Name?

By: Zachary Wadlé

The recording industry has been hard hit over the past decade.  With the advent of mp3s, iPods, and iTunes, the entire industry business model has been upended.  Unfortunately for record labels, the hits just may keep on coming.  Courtesy of the Copyright Act of 1976, record labels could soon lose copyrights over hugely popular songs authored from the late 1970’s forward that generate substantial licensing cash for the industry.  Beginning in 2013, some of the most popular musical works of this era will likely be at the center of a hard-fought battle over future ownership rights.

The Copyright Act of 1976 permits the artists of copyrighted works to terminate a grant of rights and reclaim their ownership of the works under certain conditions.  For works created on or after January 1, 1978, artists can reclaim rights to these works beginning 35 years after the original grant, which starts in 2013.  The previous copyright law required artists to wait at least 56 years to reclaim their rights.  Congress’s move to revise the copyright law in1976 and shorten the time artists must wait to reclaim rights was driven by the belief that new artists tend to sign bad deals when they’re young, hungry, and largely unknown to the public.  Congress determined that such artists deserved the option to own their compositions sooner than allowed under the previous copyright law, especially should their tunes prove to be popular (and lucrative to the record label who signed them to a presumably one-sided deal).

Continue Reading Recording Industry Braces For Potential Impact of 1976 Copyright Act Termination Rights

By: David Muradyan

Online service providers and operators of such sites should take careful note of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ recent decision in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Case No. 10-3342-cv (“Viacom”), where the court held that service providers and operators will not be protected from the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), if they have “actual knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement.”

For background, “[t]he DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,” Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001), and to update domestic copyright law for the digital age. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). In particular, the DMCA established a series of four “safe harbors” that allow qualifying service providers to limit their liability for claims of copyright infringement based on (a) “transitory digital network communications,” (b) “system caching,” (c) “information residing on systems or networks at [the] direction of users,” and (d) “information location tools.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d). The safe harbor at issue in Viacom was § 512(c), which covers infringement claims that arise “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). To qualify for protection under any of the safe harbors, a party must: (1) be a “service provider,” which is defined as “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor,” Id. § 512(k)(1)(B); (2) satisfy certain “conditions of eligibility,” including the adoption and reasonable implementation of a “repeat infringer” policy that “provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network,” Id. § 512(i)(1)(A), and (3) accommodate “standard technical measures” that are “used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” Id. §§ 512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2). The § 512(c) safe harbor will apply only if the service provider: 

Continue Reading Second Circuit Holds that YouTube Is Not Protected by the “Safe Harbor” Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act